Of all the news organizations that could have "accidently" been included on a secret DoD chat, I am pretty certain that The Atlantic would not have been the first choice of the Trump administration.
Here are a few thoughts about this:
- Was it classified? Maybe, or maybe not. Technically, it is up to the Secretary of Defense to determine whether or not that information was classified. But using any reasonable definition, we would never release specific war time information to anyone. So the rationalization for this one doesn't pass the smell test.
- Should the SecDef resign? In this specific instance, I think the answer is no, and here's why: no specific harm was done (to the troops, anyway). The raids were conducted successfully. And most of the noise is about the process to begin with. So yes - Hegseth should get a slap on the wrist, but no, I don't think that this is worthy of a resignation.
- Exposing methods is a HUGE security concern: If there is one takeaway for me, it is that the DoD is using Signal for operational communications. This is almost unbelievable to me. Basically, with this slip up, we (the US and everyone else in the cybersecurity world) has exposed that the US Department of Defense is using signal to conduct war time operations. Our enemies are likely flipping out that they now have the possibility of intercepting real time DoD communications. I am in shock that - given the technology that exists, and the resources that the United States government has at its disposal - our troops use COTS communication software for deployment and operations (as well as command and control). Can the President authorize nuclear launch using Signal?
This one goes down as an "oopsie", which is only slightly better than a clusterduck. We have not heard the last of this one, and I can only hope that the Trump administration works on processes and methods to resolve this from happing again in the future.